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This paper analyzes the potential effect of global market competition on inflation dynamics. It does
so through the lens of the Calvo model of staggered price-setting, which implies that inflation depends
on expected future inflation and a measure of marginal costs. I modify the assumption of a constant
elasticity of demand, standard in this model, to provide a channel through which an increase in the
number of traded goods may affect the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, and hence
alter the dynamic response of inflation to marginal costs. I first discuss the behavior of the variables
that drive the impact of trade openness on this response, and then I evaluate whether an increase in
the variety of traded goods of the size observed in the US in the `90s might have a sizable quantitative
impact. I find that it is difficult to argue that such an increase in trade should have generated an increase
in US market competition leading to a decline in the slope of the inflation-marginal cost relation.
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The policy debate about the macroeconomic eﬀects of globalization has centered on two
main themes: that globalization has contributed to bring down US inﬂation, and that it
has aﬀected the sensitivity of inﬂation to output ﬂuctuations. Several recent policymakers
speeches have addressed the issue of whether more intense competition, generated by the
increase in trade experienced since the ‘90s, has changed the role of domestic factors in
shaping the inﬂation process. Chairman Bernanke (2007), for example, has underlined how
the dependence of factor markets from economic conditions abroad might have reduced the
market power of domestic sellers, how the pricing power of domestic producers might have
declined, and how lower import prices both of ﬁnal and intermediate goods might have
contributed to maintain overall inﬂation at low levels. Similarly, President Yellen (2006)
and Governor Kohn (2006) have discussed several direct and indirect impacts of more global
markets on US inﬂation.
In this paper I explore how globalization might have impacted US inﬂation by using the
new Keynesian model of inﬂation dynamics as analytical framework. Within this framework,
I focus in particular on the eﬀects that an increase in market competition generated by an
increase in trade might have on the sensitivity of inﬂation to real marginal costs of production.
The relationship between inﬂation and marginal cost is a key determinant of the overall
‘slope’ of the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which links the dynamics of inﬂation to
the level of economic activity. In the price setting model most often used to derive the NKPC
(the one based on the contribution by Calvo, 1983), this relationship depends primarily on
the frequency of price changes, but it is also aﬀected by strategic complementarity in price
setting. It is this last mechanism that provides a way of formalizing the ‘globalization’
argument, according to which the increase in the openness of the economy has aﬀected the
sensitivity of inﬂation to output variations.
I depart here from the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution among diﬀerenti-
ated goods, which is typically made in the Calvo model, and adopt a speciﬁcation where the
elasticity is a function of the ﬁrm’s relative share of the market. This implies that changes
in the importance of trade that aﬀe c tr e l a t i v em a r k e ts h a r e sa ﬀect in turn the elasticity of
demand faced by ﬁrms, and hence their desired mark-ups, and so ultimately may have an
impact on the elasticity of aggregate inﬂation to real marginal costs and the slope of the
Phillips curve.
To preview the results: I ﬁnd that an increase in the number of goods traded is able to
2generate the sort of real rigidities that may lead to a change in the slope of the Phillips
curve. The sign of the change, however, depends on how fast the elasticity of substitution
among goods increases, and diﬀerent parametrizations of the demand function may lead to
diﬀerent answers. For large enough increases in the number of goods traded, the slope of the
Phillips curve is in general declining: however, the evidence on trade patterns so far provides
little ground to assume that we are yet in the declining portion of the curve.
There are a number of caveats to these results. In particular, the elasticity of inﬂation
to marginal cost is only one of the determinants of the slope of the Phillips curve - the
overall response of inﬂation to output (or output gap) - and its increase or decline does
not necessarily imply that the latter is of the same sign. However, this is arguably the
component that is aﬀected the most by variations in the degree of market competition and
it is the one relied upon in discussions of the eﬀects of global competition on the "pricing
power" of domestic ﬁrms; hence it is the one where a study of these variations should be
centered. I return to this point in the conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews existing evidence about the change
in the slope of the Phillips curve and discusses the ensued debate. Section 3 analyzes the
channels through which the increased trade that characterizes globalization may aﬀect the
dynamics of inﬂation. Section 4 introduces the analytical framework that is used to pin
down these eﬀects, and section 5 adapts the framework to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ entry
on the dynamics of price adjustments. Sections 6 and 7 evaluate the quantitative impact of
trade increase on the marginal cost slope of the Phillips curve, and section 8 concludes.
2 Has the slope of the Phillips curve changed?
The policymakers’ concerns over a change in the slope of the Phillips curve in recent years
derive from its role in assessing the cost of disinﬂation. A ﬂatter Phillips curve carries
the implication that, for a given degree of inﬂation persistence, reducing inﬂation involves
ah i g h e r‘ s a c r i ﬁce ratio’ than otherwise, namely it requires enduring a longer period of
unemployment above the natural rate for every desired percentage point of reduction in
inﬂation. On the other hand, as noted by Mishkin (2007), a ﬂatter Phillips curve also
implies that an overheated economy will tend to generate a smaller increase in inﬂation.
Most of the empirical analyses supporting the policymakers’ concerns address the issue
of the ﬂattening of the Phillips curve in the context of traditional ‘accelerationists’ Phillips
curves. Roberts (2006) and Williams (2006), for example, estimate smaller Phillips curves’
3slopes in samples covering the post-84 period. Williams in particular analyzes samples
with moving starting points - from 1980:1 to 1999:4, but with a ﬁx end point (2006:4) and
ﬁnds evidence of a ﬂatter curve and a higher sacriﬁce ratio in the samples that start in
the 1990s relative to those estimated in the full sample. However, he also ﬁnds that in
the more recent samples the unit sum restriction on the lag coeﬃcients, which deﬁnes the
accelerationist curve, is violated. Furthermore, when in these samples the lag coeﬃcients are
left unconstrained, the estimates of the slope coeﬃcient indeed increases.
A na l t e r n a t i v es o u r c eo fe v i d e n c et h a tt h eslope of the Phillips curve has declined in
more recent samples is provided by estimates in the context of general equilibrium models.
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), for example, estimate that the coeﬃcient of marginal cost in
a new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) declines from .011 to .008 in the post ‘84 period;
Smets and Wouters (2007) in a similar general equilibrium model report that the estimated
interval between price changes is higher in the 1984-2004 sample relative to the 1966-1979
period, which imply that the slope declined in the more recent period.
While the just cited studies aim at relating the change in the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ to
the change in monetary policy that took place in the early ‘80s, in a recent BIS study Borio
and Filardo (2007) link instead variations in the slope of the Phillips curve to globalization.
Speciﬁcally, they estimate a traditional Phillips curve for many countries over the two periods
1980-1992 and 1993-2005, and document that in the more recent period there has been both
a decline in the autoregressive coeﬃcient - hence a decline in inﬂation persistence, and a
decline in the slope, hence a drop in the sensitivity of inﬂation to domestic output gap. For
the United States, in particular, the authors report a decline in the estimated coeﬃcient of
lagged inﬂation from .92 to .82 across the two samples, and a decline in the elasticity of
inﬂation to output gap from .13 to .09. They take this evidence as the starting point of the
investigation of a ‘global slack’ hypothesis, according to which the decline in the sensitivity
of inﬂa t i o nt od o m e s t i cm e a s u r e so fo u t p u tg a pi se x p l a i n e db yt h ef a c tt h a tg l o b a lm e a s u r e s
of demand pressure have become in the later period the main driving force of inﬂation
dynamics.
A successor study (Ihrig et al. 2007) ﬁnds that the purported support for the global slack
hypothesis is not robust to the speciﬁcation of the measures of global slack. For example,
the study ﬁnds that variables such as domestic output time the ratio of trade to GDP,
and import prices time the ratio of imports to GDP do not have statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. The study, however, does not dispute the evidence that the Phillips curve
appears to have ﬂattened since the ‘90s; it contests the interpretation that this is indeed
4an eﬀect of globalization. Overall, the authors in fact conclude that the estimated eﬀect
of foreign output gaps is in general insigniﬁcant, that there is no evidence that the trend
decline in the sensitivity of inﬂation to domestic output is due to globalization, nor they ﬁnd
increased sensitivity of inﬂation to import prices.
An IMF study (2006) also estimates traditional inﬂation regressions where the coeﬃcient
on the slack variable interacts with measures of central bank credibility and openness of
the economy. The study estimates a negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term between
domestic output gap and trade openness, measured by the share of non-oil imports in GDP,
and interprets this result as evidence that the increase in trade has contributed to the decline
of the slope of the Phillips curve. The study, however, examines the group of advanced
economies as a whole, and doesn’t present results for the US alone. Finally, in the context
of a similar traditional Phillips curve estimated for the U.S., Ball (2006) allows interaction
of the output coeﬃcient with trade, and ﬁnds only a modest eﬀect.
In this paper I do not estimate the slope of the Phillips curve, but propose instead a way
to analyze the quantitative importance of globalization eﬀects on such a slope. Speciﬁcally
I lay down the channels through which an increase in market competition can generate
a ﬂattening of the Phillips curve, in the context of the new Keynesian model of inﬂation
dynamics.
3 Channels of globalization eﬀects on inﬂation
The basic channel emphasized both in policy debates and empirical studies as potential car-
rier of globalization eﬀects on inﬂation dynamics is trade integration, which especially when
accompanied by policy incentives, is argued to bolster competition. Increased competition,
the argument goes, creates two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect of containment of costs, by restraining
increases in workers’ compensations and reducing real import prices, and a second, indirect
eﬀect of creating pressure to innovate, which contributes to increasing productivity. Higher
productivity in turn further lowers production costs: if markups are constant, lower produc-
tion costs reduce the pressure on prices. But the margins that ﬁrms are willing to charge
over their costs might be reduced as well, moderating the extent of price increases.
To understand how these eﬀects work, it is useful to decompose the relation between
consumer price inﬂation and domestic output, the one typically analyzed in empirical studies,
in three distinct parts. First, there is the relation between CPI inﬂation and domestic
inﬂation. In an open economy, consumer price inﬂation reﬂects the price dynamics of goods
5produced both domestically and abroad that are consumed at home. Secondly, there is the
relation between domestic inﬂation and the marginal cost of production, and ﬁnally the
relationship between the marginal cost of production and domestic output.
The central relationship, that describes how variations in marginal cost translate into
ﬂuctuations in domestic prices, is the one most likely aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nc o m p e t i t i o n .
When analyzed through the lenses of the new Keynesian approach to the construction
of a Phillips curve, the strength of this relationship depends on a number of factors. The
ﬁrst is the frequency of price revisions: the longer prices are kept ﬁxed, the more nominal
disturbances translate into real eﬀects, rather than aggregate inﬂation. This is referred to as
the nominal rigidity component. The second component is the sensitivity of the desired ﬁrms’
price to marginal costs versus other prices. If price setters take into account other ﬁrms’
prices when they set their own price, then the presence of even a small number of ﬁrms that
do not change their price induces ﬂexible-price ﬁrms to change their price by a lesser amount.
A third component is the sensitivity of marginal costs to the own output of the ﬁrm (versus
its sensitivity to the average marginal cost): when marginal costs of the price setter are
increasing in its own output, the desired price increase is smaller because the ﬁrm takes into
account the decline in marginal cost due to the loss in demand when the price is increased.
Finally, the pricing decisions are aﬀected by the sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s own output to its
relative price, namely by how elastic is the demand curve of the individual producer. The last
three components are commonly referred to as ‘strategic complementarity’ or ‘real rigidity’
channels.1
Both nominal and real rigidities are known to be important in assessing the size of the
‘slope’ of the new Keynesian Phillips curve with respect to marginal costs. They have
been analyzed in theoretical works and explored in empirical studies aiming at reconciling
estimated ‘slopes’ with reasonable degrees of nominal rigidity.2
In this paper I focus on the real rigidity component and analyze how it can be aﬀected
by the openness of the economy, through the increase in competitiveness generated by an
increase in the number of goods traded in the economy.
To do this I borrow from the new trade literature, and in particular from a recent con-
tribution by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who present a model of trade with monopolistic
competition and ﬁrm heterogeneity to study the eﬀect of trade liberalization on productivity
1See Woodford (2003) ch. 3. The term ‘real rigidity’ was introduced, I believe, by Ball and Romer (1989).
2See literature cited later.
6and mark-ups. The authors show that import competition induces a downward shift in the
distribution of markups across ﬁrms. A key element of their model is the dependence of the
elasticity of demand upon the relative size of the market. This setting has been used in a
macro general equilibrium model by Bilbiie et al (2006a and 2006b) to study endogenous
entry as a propagation of business cycles, and the eﬃciency properties of the model, adopting
a framework of ﬂexible prices.
Here I study instead a model of staggered prices. I consider a monopolistically competitive
market where there is a ﬁxed entry cost, and a given distribution of ﬁrms. A reduction
in the individual ﬁrms production costs moves up the ﬁrms’ distribution curve, making
proﬁtable for more ﬁrms to enter the market. The resulting increase in the variety of goods
traded increases the overall degree of competition: this is captured in the model by making
the demand elasticity, and hence the mark-up, vary with the number of goods that are
traded. Variable mark-ups in turn impact the price setting process and the dynamics of the
relationship between inﬂation and marginal cost.
M yf o c u si ss p e c i ﬁcally on how the process of new entries and the interaction of ﬁrms
in the price setting process aﬀect the relationship between aggregate inﬂation and marginal
costs. I will not discuss the other two components of the CPI inﬂation - domestic output
relationship that I described, the relation between domestic and CPI inﬂation, and the
relation between marginal cost and domestic output. These relationships obviously matter
for the assessment of the overall eﬀect of openness on the Phillips curve’s slope, and an
explicit modeling of the Phillips curve in open economy may as well illustrate that its slope
is lower than that of the closed economy.3 Nevertheless, understanding the channels through
which market entry changes the degree of real rigidity, and how that may emphasize or
reduce the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ, is of primary importance.
Similarly, I will not discuss eﬀects of globalization on inﬂation of the kind argued by
Rogoﬀ (2003, 2006), that in a global environment central banks have less incentive to inﬂate
the economy. Although this lower incentive is another eﬀect of the increased competitive-
ness of the economy, it is related to central banks’ incentives,4 rather than to the market
mechanisms to which I am interested in here.
3Several aspects of the diﬀerence between open and closed economy are discussed by Woodford (2007, in
this volume).
4The increase in competitiveness on one hand reduces the monopoly wedge that determines the inﬂation
bias of the central bank, and on the other makes prices and wages more ﬂexible, reducing the real eﬀects of
unanticipated monetay policy, hence the gain from inﬂating.
74 A structural framework
The Calvo model of staggered prices provides a useful framework to disentangle the various
theoretical channels that compose the inﬂation-marginal cost relationship. Since the baseline
model is well known, here I summarize its main features to set the stage for the generalizations
that I discuss next.
The model has a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms, indexed by i, which produce diﬀer-
entiated goods, also indexed by i, over which consumers’ preferences are deﬁned. Firms
produce with a constant returns to scale technology and have access to economy-wide factor








for θ>1; here pt (i) is the individual good i price, Ct indicates ﬁrm level output, deﬁned by







and Pt is the corresponding aggregate price (the minimum cost to buy a unit of the aggregate
good Ct): Pt =
£R
pt(i)1−θdi
¤1/(1−θ). The model further assumes random intervals between
price changes: in every period, only a fraction (1 − α) of the ﬁrms can set a new price,
independently of the past history of price changes, which will then be kept ﬁxed until the
next time the ﬁrm is drawn to change prices again. By letting α v a r yb e t w e e n0a n d1 ,t h e
model nests assumptions about the degree of price stickiness from perfect ﬂexibility (α =0 )
to complete price rigidity (the limit as α → 1). The expected time between price changes is
then 1/(1 − α).
The pricing problem of a ﬁrm that revises its price in period t is to choose the price pt (i)
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Log-linearizing these two equilibrium conditions around a steady state with zero inﬂation,
with usual manipulations, one obtains the familiar form of inﬂation dynamics as function of
expected inﬂation and real marginal costs st
πt = ζb st + βEtπt+1 (6)
where a hat indicates the log-deviation from a non-stochastic steady state, β is the steady
state value of the discount factor, and the ‘slope’ is deﬁned as5
ζ =
(1 − αβ)(1− α)
α
. (7)
In this baseline framework, the extent of the nominal rigidity determines how marginal
costs translate into inﬂation ﬂuctuations. In order to consider other potential channels of
the kind discussed above the model needs to be generalized.
4.1 The inﬂation/marginal cost relation: some generalizations
Generalizations of the baseline model can lead to changes in the nominal rigidity component
of the slope or introduce some form of real rigidity of the kind discussed previously by adding
new terms to expression (7).
One instance in which the nominal rigidity term is modiﬁed, despite maintaining an ex-
ogenous probability of changing prices, occurs when one allows for a non-zero steady state
inﬂation. In this case the expression for inﬂation dynamics is derived as a (log) linear approx-
imation of the model equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) around a steady state characterized
by positive, rather than zero inﬂation, as it is the case in the baseline model. Such an ap-
proximation modiﬁes the terms in the discount and the rigidity coeﬃcient in the slope (9).









where Π denotes the gross trend inﬂation rate. The slope in this case depends not only upon
the primitives of the Calvo model, the probability of changing prices 1−α and the elasticity
5Throughout the paper I will use the term slope to indicate the elasticity of inﬂation to marginal cost,
rather than to output.
9of demand, but also upon the steady state level of inﬂation. In this case the NKPC has also
a richer dynamics, because it includes additional forward-looking terms, unless particular
forms of indexation are postulated.6
A further modiﬁcation of the nominal rigidity component is obtained by replacing the
assumption of a constant probability of price re-optimization with a state-dependent prob-
ability (see Dotsey, King and Wolman 1999).
The generalizations that provide a more direct channel through which the competitive
eﬀect of more global markets integration can alter the Phillips curve’s slope are those that
introduce real rigidity factors in the slope coeﬃcient. Such modiﬁcations were at ﬁrst in-
troduced with the purpose of reconciling empirical estimates of the slope with a degree of
nominal rigidity more in line with that documented in ﬁrms’ surveys.7 In fact, for any given
degree of nominal rigidity, the existence of strategic complementarity lowers the slope or,
alternatively, a given empirical estimate of the slope is consistent with a lower degree of
nominal rigidity.
Assuming for example that some or all factor markets are ﬁrm-speciﬁci m p l i e st h a tt h e
marginal cost of supplying goods to the market is not equal for all goods at any speciﬁcp o i n t
i nt i m e .I ns u c hc a s e sﬁrms’ marginal costs depend not only on economy-wide factors, but
also on the ﬁrm’s own output8 and, for any given increase in marginal cost, this dependence
makes the desired price increase smaller. Returning to a baseline case with zero steady state
inﬂation, the slope ζ in these cases becomes
ζ =





where the strategic complementarity term 1
1+θsy depends upon the demand elasticity θ, which
measures the sensitivity of the own output of the ﬁrm to its relative price, and the sensitivity
6If one assumes that non re-optimized prices are indexed at least partly to trend inﬂation, this additional
dynamics is eliminated and the slope is unaﬀected by the steady state inﬂation Π. Models with positive trend
inﬂation can be generalized to the case of time-varying steady state inﬂation; in this case the model describes
the dynamics of inﬂation deviations from a time-varying trend: b πt =l n ( Πt/Πt)). Cogley-Sbordone (2005)
estimate a NKPC with time-varying trend inﬂation. Ireland (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2003), among
others, estimate general equilibrium models in the new Keynesian literature allowing for a time varying trend
inﬂation; their assumptions however deliver a time-invariant slope.
7For evidence from survey data see for example, Blinder et al. (1998).
8Sbordone (2002) discusses this case. A more sophisticated model assumes that capital is endogenously
determined, and its limited reallocation is due to the existence of adjustment costs. Woodford (2005)
discusses this model, and concludes that the hypothesis of a ﬁx e dc a p i t a li sag o o de n o u g ha p p r o x i m a t i o n .
For another empirical application, see Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007).
10of the ﬁrm’s marginal cost to its own output, sy. The parameter sy in turn depends on other
model assumptions: for example, when labor is traded in an economy-wide labor market
but capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc and therefore cannot be instantaneously reallocated across ﬁrms,
a constant returns to scale production function implies that sy i se q u a lt ot h er a t i oo ft h e
output elasticities with respect to capital and labor.9 In a more general case where labor
m a r k e t sa sw e l la r eﬁrm-speciﬁc, the parameter sy is a composite parameter that includes also
the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work with respect to output increases (Woodford,
2003).
Another extension is the case in which each ﬁrm’s desired mark-up over its marginal cost
depends upon the prices of other ﬁrms. Since the desired mark-up depends on the ﬁrm’s elas-
ticity of demand, a variable desired mark-up requires a variable demand elasticity. Modeling
this case then requires departing from the constant elasticity of substitution assumption of
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. For example, the aggregator proposed in the macro literature
by Kimball (1995) allows for the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods to be
a function of their relative market share.
Kimball was interested in a variable elasticity of demand to generate countercyclical
movements in the ﬁrm’s desired mark-up, and suﬃcient real rigidity to make a model of
sticky prices plausible (i.e. without having to assume too large a percentage of ﬁrms with long
periods of unadjusted prices). His objective was to generate more ﬂexible demand functions,
particularly ‘quasi-kinked’ demand functions, characterized by the property that for the
ﬁrm at its normal market share it is easier to lose customers by increasing its relative price
than to gain customers by lowering its relative price. By making the elasticity of demand
depend upon the ﬁrm’s relative sales, Kimball’s preferences generate another kind of strategic
complementarity that ampliﬁes the eﬀect of nominal disturbances and, everything else equal,
reduces the size of the Phillips curve’s slope.10 Such property has spurred new research on
various implications of the assumption of a non-constant elasticity of substitution. Dotsey
and King (2005) use a speciﬁc functional form for the Kimball aggregator in a calibrated
DSGE model to study the dynamic response of inﬂation and output to monetary shocks
in the context of a state-dependent pricing model. Levin, Lopez-Salido and Yun (2006)
adopt the Kimball speciﬁcation to analyze the interaction of strategic complementarity and
steady state inﬂation. In empirical work, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) use the same
9For example, with a Cobb-Douglas production technology sy = a/(1 − a), where 1 − a is the output
elasticity with respect to labor.
10See the discussion of these preferences in the context of models with price rigidities in Woodford (2003).
11speciﬁcation to pin down a realistic estimate of the frequency of price re-optimization in
the Calvo model. Finally, in the context of an open economy model, Gust et al. (2006)
extend these preferences to the demand of home produced and imported goods, to show that
with strategic complementarity lower trade costs reduce the pass-through of exchange rate
movements to import prices.
Departing from the constant demand elasticity assumption along the lines of Kimball,








di =1 , (10)
where ψ (¦) is an increasing, strictly concave function, and Ω is the set of all potential goods
produced (a real line). With this notation the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator corresponds to the
case where ψ(ct (i)/Ct)=( ct (i)/Ct)
(θ−1)/θ for some θ>1. With an aggregator function
of the form (10) one can show11 that the Calvo model implies an inﬂation dynamics of the
baseline form, where the slope (again for simplicity, in the case of zero steady state inﬂation)
becomes
ζ =
(1 − αβ)(1− α)
α
1
1+θ(sy +  µ)
. (11)
Here θ is the steady state value of the ﬁrm’s elasticity of demand, which is now a function
θ(x) of the ﬁrm’s relative sales (denoted by x);  µ is the steady state value of the function
 µ (x) that represents the elasticity of the mark-up function µ(x), which also depends on
the ﬁrm’s relative sales; sy is the steady state value of the elasticity of the ﬁrm’s marginal
cost with respect to its own sales. The interactions of the new variables in the strategic
complementarity term 1
1+θ(sy+ µ) determines to what extent the slope ζ diﬀers from that of
the baseline case.
Expression (11) formalizes all the channels discussed in section 3 as those through which
globalization may aﬀect the strength of the relationship between inﬂation and marginal costs.
It shows that the slope coeﬃcient depends upon a number of variables: (i) the frequency of
price revisions, represented by the coeﬃcient α : less frequent price revisions (a higher value
of α) correspond to lower ζ; (ii) the sensitivity of the desired ﬁrm’s price to marginal cost
versus other prices, the term  µ : higher sensitivity reduces the slope; (iii) the sensitivity
of marginal cost to the own output of the ﬁrm, the term sy; and (iv) the sensitivity of the
ﬁrm’s own output to the relative price, θ. In addition, the slope is possibly aﬀected by the
level of steady state inﬂation, which may interact with the demand elasticity, as in (8).
11See the later derivation for the speciﬁc parametrization considered.
12The Calvo model enriched with these modiﬁc a t i o n si sn o was u i t a b l ef r a m e w o r kf o r
discussing the eﬀects of globalization: the task is to relate the factors that drive the value of
the slope to the increase in trade openness, that is one of the characteristics of a more global
environment. This is what I consider next. Leaving aside the issue of whether globalization
aﬀects the frequency of price adjustments, and more generally the nominal rigidity term, in
the next section I focus on the eﬀects of an increase in trade on the strategic complementarity
term.
5T h e e ﬀect of ﬁrms’ entry
5.1 Kimball preferences with a variable number of goods
I extend Kimball’s (1995) model to an environment where the number of traded goods
is variable. The model implies that the elasticity of demand depends on the ﬁrm’s relative
output share: by relating this share to the number of goods traded the steady-state elasticity
of demand becomes function of the number of traded goods in steady state. This implies
that the degree of strategic complementarity varies with the number of traded goods, hence
so does the slope of the inﬂation-marginal cost curve.
I assume that households’ utility is deﬁn e do v e ra na g g r e g a t eCt of diﬀerentiated goods
ct (i),d e ﬁned implicitly by (10), where ψ (¦) is an increasing, strictly concave function, and I
also assume that ψ(0) = 0. If the set of goods that happen to be sold is [0,N], then ct (i)=0








di =1 . (12)







where x indicates the relative market share of the diﬀerentiated goods. In Kimball’s formu-
lation the elasticity of demand is lower for those goods that sell more because their relative






12Note that under this assumption changes in the number of goods available for sale involve no change in
preferences as the utility function is independent of N. This contrast with Benassy’s (1996) generalization
of the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, that depend on the value N.
























for each i [0,N], where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (12). The solution to
this minimization problem gives the demand for each good i as
ct (i)=Ctψ
0−1 (pt (i)ΛtCt), (16)








di =1 . (17)
Expression (17) deﬁnes a price index e Pt ≡ 1
ΛtCt for any set of prices {pt (i)}, which is








Note that the aggregate ‘price’ e Pt is not in general the same as the conventional price index,
which here is deﬁned, as in the case of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, as the cost of a unit of the
















where the second equality follows from (18). Both Pt and e Pt, however, are homogeneous of
degree one functions in {pt (i)}.
5.2 Steady state with symmetric prices
I am interested in the properties of the demand curve in a steady state with symmetric prices
pt (i)=pt for all i. In this case it follows from (12) that the relative demand ct (i)/Ct is
equal to







































denotes the relative share in the symmetric steady state. Note how this
elasticity diﬀers from the case of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, where the elasticity of demand
is a constant θ(x)=θ for all x. Here the demand elasticity depends upon the relative market
share of the good, and its value in steady state, θ, is a function of the number of goods traded
in steady state, N. I am interested in seeing how this steady state elasticity θ varies with
N. The extent of this variation depends on how the elasticity function θ(x) varies with x.13
T h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d es of a rd on o th a v ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h es i g no fθ
0 (x). However,






is decreasing in N, it follows that θ is increasing in N. T h i si si nl i n ew i t ht h e
general intuition that more goods are traded in a market, more likely it is for the demand
to decrease more in response to a small increase in prices.
As θ varies with the number of goods traded, so does the desired mark-up of prices over
costs, evaluated in steady state. I deﬁne the steady state desired mark-up as µ ≡ θ
θ−1 : if
θ is increasing in N, then the steady state desired mark-up is decreasing in N.F o rw h a ti t
is discussed later on it is also important to evaluate the extent to which the mark-up itself,
as deﬁned in (14), varies with the relative sales, and therefore with the number of traded
goods.








13The function θ(¦) could also be expressed as a function of the relative price, rather than the market
share, as in Gust et al. (2006).































































The elasticity of µ with respect to N has therefore the opposite sign of the elasticity  µ.
In turn we can determine how  µ must vary with N by considering how  µ(x) varies with
x. Since we can argue that logµ is a convex function of logx,16 it follows from deﬁnition
(24) that  µ(x) is an increasing function of x : w ec a nt h e nc o n c l u d et h a t µ is a decreasing
function of N .
Finally, it can be shown that the steady state sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s marginal cost to its
own output, sy, is also a function of N. This elasticity depends upon assumptions about the
form of the production function and about consumer preferences, which I haven’t spelled out
yet. I make here some simplifying assumptions to illustrate the nature of the dependence of
sy on N. Let the production function of ﬁrm i be
yt (i)=ht (i)
1−a − Φ (26)
14Note that this elasticity could alternatively deﬁned as  µ(x)=− θ(x)/[θ(x) − 1], where  θ(x)=
∂ log θ(x)
∂ logx .
15The value of  µ is important to determine the degree of strategic complementarities in price setting, for
small departures from the uniform-price steady state (see Woodford 2003).
16This follows from the hypothesis that θ
0 (x) < 0, so that µ(x) is an increasing function of x. In this case
it is not possible for logµ to be a concave function of logx, because this would require logµ to be negative
for positive, and small enough x. But this can’t happen, no matter how large θ(x) gets for small x.I flogµ
must be convex at least for small values of x, it is convenient to assume that it is a globally convex function
of logx.
16where Φ is a ﬁxed cost. This leads to a labor demand function
ht (i)=( yt (i)+Φ)
1
1−a (27)
Assuming an economy -wide labor market, with nominal wage Wt, the total cost of production












where Γt indicates aggregate variables that enter into the determination of ﬁrms’ marginal
























where again x = ψ
−1 (1/N) and I denoted the steady state of aggregate output by Y. Since
both x and Y are functions of N,s oi ssy: whether it increases or decreases with N depends
upon whether x or 1/Y decreases more sharply with N. I discuss this point with some detail
in the appendix.
We have thus established that the steady state elasticity of demand θ is increasing in N,
while the elasticity of the desired mark-up evaluated in steady state  µ is decreasing in N;
how the elasticity of the marginal cost to ﬁrm’s own output sy depends on N is established
numerically in the quantitative exercise. The overall role of N in the price/marginal cost
relationship is examined next.
5.3 The price setting problem
The ﬁrms pricing problem in this set up generalizes the one considered in section 4. Price
setting ﬁrms at t choose their price pt(i) to maximize the following expected string of proﬁts













































































. The functions θ(x) and µ(x) are the functions
deﬁn e di n( 1 3 )a n d( 1 4 ) ,a n ds(yt (i);Γt) is the real marginal cost of producing quantity yt (i)
in period t, given aggregate state Γt, which is unaﬀected by the pricing decision of ﬁrm i.17




























































∂ logyt(i)|ss, b st =l o gs(Yt;Γt)−logs(Y ;Γ)|ss, and the steady state values follow from previous







































































which, to a ﬁrst order approximation, gives

















17Note that the real marginal cost is deﬁned as the ratio MCt (i)/Pt, not the ratio MCt (i)/e Pt.



































































e πt = πt.
Under the assumption of Calvo staggered prices, we can also write the expression for the
































= αlogPt−1 +( 1− α)(b p
∗
t +l o gPt)
where the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of b p∗
t. We then have
αlogPt = αlogPt−1 +( 1− α) b p
∗
t. (33)
5.4 The slope of the NKPC


























With typical transformations, (34) and (35) imply again an expression for inﬂation of the
form
πt = ζb st + βEtπt+1
19where, however, the slope is now deﬁned as in (11), and more explicitly as
ζ =
(1 − αβ)(1− α)
α
1
1+θ(N)[ µ (N)+sy (N)]
. (36)
Through the terms  µ, sy and θ the slope ζ depends upon the number of goods traded in
steady state.18 As we discussed, θ is increasing in N while  µ is decreasing in N,a n dt h e
elasticity sy w i l lb es h o w nt ob ea sw e l ld e c r e a s i n gi nN. The net eﬀect of a change in the
s t e a d ys t a t ev a l u eo ft r a d e dg o o d so nt h es l o p ed e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h ec h a n g e s
in all these variables. This is what I analyze next.
6 Quantitative eﬀect of trade increase on the PC slope
In order to evaluate the quantitative impact of the trade increase on the slope ζ, I need to
parametrize the function ψ(x). First, I choose a functional form along the lines of Dotsey










where the constant term is chosen to satisfy the condition ψ(0) = 0 stated above.














which is a sum of a constant and a Dixit-Stiglitz term, and where the parameters γ and η
control the elasticity and the curvature of the function. I discuss later thec h o i c eo fp a r t i c u l a r
values for the parameters γ and η that I use for the quantitative exercise.
Using the derivations of the previous section, I can now write explicit expressions for the
variables that enter the slope of the Phillips curve that show how they depend on N in a




















18It should also be observed that N has an additional eﬀect on the inﬂation dynamics that can be seen by
rewriting (6) as
πt = ζ (logst − logs)+βEtπt+1.
The steady state value of the marginal cost is function of the steady state mark-up µ and the steady state







20the steady state elasticity (23) is
θ =
η − (1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
(γ − 1)(1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
, (38)
and the elasticity of mark-up (25) is the following function of N:
 µ =
η(γ − 1)(1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
¡
η − (1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
¢¡
η − γ(1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
¢.
Finally, the steady state mark-up is
µ =
η − (1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
η − γ(1 + η)ψ
−1 (1/N)
.
By calibrating values for the parameters η and γ, we can evaluate the quantitative eﬀect of
an increase in N on the slope of the inﬂation - marginal cost function.
Unfortunately the literature doesn’t oﬀer much guidance for what are the most plausible
values for η and γ. One possibility is to choose a combination of these two parameters that
guarantees a desired value for the mark-up (hence for the demand elasticity) in a steady state
where the relative share x is equal to 1. Dotsey and King (2005), for example, set γ =1 .02,
and determine η so that θ(1) = 10 (or a mark up of 11%), which gives η = −6.19 Levin et
al. (2006), in order to have a markup of 16% in their baseline case, choose instead a lower
value for the demand elasticity at 1, setting θ(1) = 7, and set η = −2. In an open economy
model Gust et al. (2006) choose η to match their model’s implications for the volatility of
output, and then select γ to give a 20% markup pricing in steady state (and θ(1) = 6).T h i s
implies setting γ =1 .15 and η = −1.87.T h el a r g e ri sη in absolute value, the more concave
is the demand function. This is shown in ﬁgure 1 for the case in which θ(1) = 7, and in
ﬁgure 2 for the case of θ(1) = 10. The red line with circles in each ﬁgure corresponds to
η =0 , which is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity case.
I will start by considering the implications of the parametrization of Levin et al. (2006),
and then evaluate the case of a lower initial mark-up, as assumed in the parametrization
of Dotsey and King. Both these parametrizations assume an elasticity at the point of unit
market share relatively in line with constant elasticity estimates obtained from macro data.20
19It follows from (23) that for x =1 : θ = −1
(γ−1)(1+η).
20At the macro level, Cogley-Sbordone (2005) estimate a Calvo model with a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation
and time-varying inﬂation trend; they estimate the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity using aggregate data on inﬂation,
unit labor costs, output and interest rates across subperiods (chosen a priori as representing periods of
diﬀerent steady state inﬂation). They do not ﬁnd evidence that the elasticity diﬀers across the subsamples,
which cover pre and post 1990, and estimate an elasticity of about 10.














η  = −3, γ  = 1.07
η  = −2, γ  = 1.14
η  = 0, γ  = 0.86
Figure 1: Demand functions for various parametrizations; θ(x)=7at x =1 .

















η  = −3, γ  = 1.05
η  = −2, γ  = 1.10
η  = 0, γ  = .90
Figure 2: Demand functions for various parametrizations; θ(x)=1 0at x =1 .














η  = −3, γ  = 1.16
η  = −2, γ  = 1.33
η  = 0, γ  = 0.66
Figure 3: Demand functions for various parametrizations; θ(x)=3at x =1 .
With micro data, however, the estimate of the elasticity of substitution depends on the level
of aggregation. Broda and Weinstein (2006), for example, estimate elasticities for a larger
number of goods at three diﬀerent levels of aggregation, and found higher elasticities for more
disaggregated sectors, showing that varieties are more close substitute when disaggregation
is higher. Although their estimated elasticities cover a wide range of values, the median
elasticities for the period 1972-88 range from 2.5 to 3.7, depending on the aggregation level.21
This suggests to investigate as well the eﬀects of parametrizations based on the assumption
of a much lower elasticity in the initial steady state: by identifying this state with the period
1972-1988, which represents a pre-globalization period, I consider the case of θ(1) = 3.
Figure 3 shows the demand functions for this case, in a manner analogous to ﬁgures 1 and
2.
As for the choice of the two parameters η and γ, for each of the assumed initial values
of θ, I choose two alternative values for η, −3 and −2, as reported in the ﬁgures: more
negative values would make the demand curve too kinked. Given η,av a l u ef o rγ follows
21It’s also interesting to note that their estimated elasticities, across each disaggregation group, rather
than increase, appear to decrease, albeit slightly, in the 1990-2001 period versus the 1972-1988. Their
interpretation is that imported goods have become more diﬀerentiated over time.
23from expression (23) evaluated at x =1 .
Figure 4 shows the various components of the ‘strategic complementarity’ term of the
slope and the slope itself, for a given nominal rigidity component,22 adopting the parame-
trization of Levin et al. (2006).23 T h eg r a p ho nt h et o p - l e f tc o r n e rs h o w st h em a r k e ts h a r e
as function of traded goods, x = ψ
−1 (1/N)); the following graphs show the steady state
demand elasticity θ, the mark up µ, the markup elasticity  µ, the elasticity of the marginal
cost to output sy, and the Phillips curve slope ζ, all as functions of the number of traded
goods N, which is on the horizontal axis (the functions are all evaluated at x = ψ
−1 (1/N)).
The curves with crosses depict the case of a more concave demand (η = −3, and γ =1 .07);
the starred curves correspond to a less concave demand function (η = −2, and γ =1 .14).
Note how the decline in the desired mark-up is consistent with the evidence that an increase
in trade is making the economy more competitive, as documented for example by Chen,
Imbs and Scott (2006) for European countries.
The behavior of the real rigidity component of the slope depends on how the two products
θ µ and syθ, which are on the denominator of expression (36), vary with the number of traded
goods N. For both the chosen parametrizations in the ﬁgure, the demand elasticity θ (graph
on the top right corner) increases almost linearly in N, and the elasticity sy (graph on the
bottom left of the ﬁgure) decreases almost linearly in N. The mark-up elasticity  µ is a
convex function of N, which declines quite rapidly as N increases from low values in the
case of a more concave demand function (the blue curves with crosses). This sharp decline
in  µ causes a decline in the product θ µ which, at low values of N, dominates the increase
in the term syθ d e t e r m i n i n gam o d e r a t ei n c r e a s ei nt h es l o p ef o rt h e s ev a l u e s .I nt h ec a s eo f
a less concave function, as the green lines with stars show, the two terms θ µ and syθ oﬀset
o n ea n o t h e r ,s ot h a ta tl o wv a l u e so fN the slope curve is essentially unchanged, and then it
declines monotonically. For large enough values of N, however, the slope declines regardless
of the concavity of the demand function.
To evaluate how sensitive this outcome is to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the parameters of
the aggregator function, the next two ﬁgures plot the behavior of the same variables for the
two alternative parametrizations discussed: one obtained by imposing that the parameters
deliver a lower mark-up in the steady state with unit market share (the Dotsey-King case),
22Recall that this term is deﬁned as
(1−α)(1−αβ)
α and doesn’t depend on N. I calibrate β = .99 and α = .7,
which corresponds to an average interval of 9-10 months between price changes.
23That is, the combinations of the parameters η and γ are such that the demand elasticity in a steady
state with unit market share is equal to 7.
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η  = −3
η  = −2
Figure 4: Parametrizations: η = −2,γ=1 .14, and η = −3,γ=1 .07






































































η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
Figure 5: Parametrizations: η = −2,γ=1 .10, and η = −3,γ=1 .05.
the other where the initial steady state mark-up is very high (the case of Broda-Weinstein).
The speciﬁc calibrations of the parameters η and γ are indicated in each ﬁgure.
Figure 5 plots the same variables as in ﬁgure 4 for a combination of parameters η and γ
that deliver a demand elasticity θ =1 0at x =1 .A st h eﬁgure shows, this case is relatively
similar to the previous one, except that the term θ µ has a weaker eﬀects of the slope,
reducing the extent to which the slope increases when N increases near the low initial level.
Larger diﬀerences can instead be observed for the case where the aggregator function
is parametrized to deliver a smaller elasticity in the steady state with unit market share
(θ(1) = 3) . This case is reported in ﬁgure 6.



































































η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
η  = −3
η  = −2
Figure 6: Parametrizations: η = −2,γ=1 .33, and η = −3,γ=1 .16.
The ﬁgure shows that the elasticity of demand increases at a slower rate with the increase
in N, and the mark-up elasticity, which is very high at the initial steady state, declines very
sharply when N increases: this decline makes the term θ µ dominate once again the behavior
of the slope. As the graph on the bottom right shows, in this case the slope increases for
a larger range of values of N for both parametrizations, and more markedly so the more
concave is the demand function. Also, as N grows the slope eventually declines but, for the
range of values considered in the ﬁgure, it remains always above its initial value.
276.1 Measuring the trade increase
The previous ﬁgures illustrate how moving from a steady state with low N to a steady state
with high N has a potential eﬀect on the slope of the NK Phillips curve. However, the
assessment of the magnitude of the change in the slope is sensitive to the parametrization
of the demand curve. And, within each parametrization, it matters how big is the level of
traded goods that characterizes the new steady state, because of the non monotonicity of
the slope function ζ. Hence, in order to make a quantitative assessment of the impact of
t h ei n c r e a s ei nm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o no nt h en e wK e y n e s i a nP h i l l i p sc u r v et r a d e - o ﬀ, one has
to measure the size of the increase in trade associated with the globalization of the ‘90 in a
way appropriate to represent the variable N of the model.
US goods imports have signiﬁcantly increased in the 1960-2006 period. Figure 7 shows
that the share of goods imports on GDP went from a little more than 4 percent in 1960 to
about 22 percent by the end of 2006, with an increase from about 12 to 22 percent since
1989. For this latest period, however, the increase in import share excluding oil products is
more modest going from about 8 to 12 percent.
The model however associates the increase in competition with an increase in the number
of goods traded in the economy. For this purpose a more appropriate measure is provided
by the number of varieties, as reported in the study by Broda and Weinstein (2006), which
addresses the issue of the eﬀect of globalization on trade.
Broda and Weinstein study the period 1972-2001, which they divide in two sub-periods,
1972-1988 and 1990-2001, and for each of them they report the number of varieties traded.24
From 1990 to 2001 they register an increase in the total varieties of goods available to
consumers of about 42% : the number of varieties went from approximately 182,000 to about
259,000 (table I of the paper). They observe, though, that a large number of varieties have a
very small market share: to correct for a possible bias, they also provide a measure of value-
weighted varieties. Under this measure, the increase in varieties is much smaller, of the
order of 5 percent.25 I nt h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee x e r c i s eIc o n d u c tb e l o wIt a k et h e s et w on u m b e r s
as rough measures of the increase in the number of goods N to evaluate the eﬀect of such
24They deﬁne a variety as “import of a particular good from a particular country” (p. 550) and use two
diﬀerent sources for each subperiod (data on 1989 are not included because of the uniﬁcation of Germany in
that year, which makes the data not comparable with those of the following years).
25This is obtained from the reported λ ratio in table VII of Broda-Weinstein (2006). The gross increase
in varieties is computed as the inverse of the (median) λ ratio reported for the corrected count and for the
one in table I.
















Figure 7: Goods Imports / GDP ratios, 1960 - 2006




















































η  = −3, γ =1.07 η  = −2, γ =1.14
η  = −3, γ =1.16 η  = −2, γ =1.33
Figure 8: Eﬀect of N on the slope ζ
increases on the degree of competitiveness and on the slope of the Phillips curve.
The ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 8 reproduces the slope obtained under the two parametrizations of
the aggregator function reported in ﬁgure 4. Consider ﬁrst the case of η = −3 (the graph on
the left): if we characterize the initial steady state as one where the relative share is x =1 ,
then in this steady state the number of goods traded is approximately N =1 /ψ(x)=.96,
while by construction the elasticity of demand at that point is θ =7 . As discussed, the
increase in the quantity of traded goods documented by Broda and Weinstein (2006) is of
the order of 5 percent in terms of the value-weighted measure, but of about 42 percent
without the weight. The shaded area between the ﬁrst two vertical lines (from left to right)
indicates the eﬀect of moving from the initial steady state to a new steady state with a
number of traded goods 5 percent higher. The vertical line farther to the right indicates
a new steady state where the number of traded goods is instead 42 higher than the initial
value. As the graph shows, a 5 percent increase in N is too small a change to aﬀect the size
of the slope: the decline in the product θ µ is almost entirely oﬀs e tb yt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
30term syθ, so that the slope is essentially unchanged for these low values of N (ζ = .0185).A
42 percent increase, on the other hand, generates an overall increase in the term ( µ + sy)θ
(the decline in the component θ µ is more than oﬀs e tb yt h ei n c r e a s ei nsyθ) so that the
slope declines from about 0.0185 to 0.015. In the case of a less concave demand function
(graph on the upper right) even a small increase in the steady state value of N has the eﬀect
of lowering the value of the slope. In this case, in fact, the increase in the component syθ
dominates the ‘real rigidity’ component of the slope, making ζ smaller for any value of N
larger than the initial value (the maximum decline of the slope is from 0.022 to 0.0181).
The quantitative assessment that emerges from the second row of ﬁgure 8 is quite diﬀer-
ent. Here I report how the PC slope varies with N in the two parametrizations considered
in ﬁgure 6, which, relative to the previous case, start from a lower steady state elasticity
(θ(1) = 3). As in the row above, the slope in the left graph is obtained from a parametriza-
tion which corresponds to a more concave demand function, relative to the one on the right.
In both cases, as we observed from the discussion in the previous section, the slope tends to
raise with N for a large range of values. In the initial steady state the slope is about 0.019;
in a steady state where N is only 5 percent higher, the slope raises to 0.021, and in a steady
state where N is almost twice as high the slope would be 0.023. The result is very similar
in the case of a less concave demand function (graph on the bottom right of the ﬁgure),
a l t h o u g ht h es i z eo ft h es l o p ei nt h i sc a s ei sh i g h e rf o ra l lv a l u e so fN.
Overall, according to the model presented, it would be diﬃcult to argue that the increase
in trade observed in the ‘90s in the US should have generated an increase in competition
that could lead to a decline in the slope of the inﬂation/ marginal cost relation. It is indeed
quite possible that the increased competition has instead resulted in an increase in the slope.
Moreover, this conclusion is obtained without allowing for any increase in the frequency of
price adjustment in a more competitive environment, of the kind hypothesized by Rogoﬀ
(2003). Note, however, that since one is comparing two diﬀerent steady states, the results
depend very critically on the curvature of the demand function in the initial steady state,
and on how far the new steady state is from the initial one.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I discuss whether globalization, by generating an increase in market compe-
tition, has the potential of reducing the inﬂation output trade-oﬀ, namely whether it is
responsible for the ﬂattening the Phillips curve that many empirical analyses suggest oc-
31curred in the past twenty years or so.
I use the Calvo model of inﬂation dynamics to disentangle the components of this trade-
oﬀ, and focus on the relationship between inﬂation and marginal costs. To analyze how this
relationship, which I call the relevant ‘slope’, is aﬀected by trade and market competition I
depart from the model’s traditional assumption of a constant elasticity of demand, making
this elasticity depend instead on the relative market share of the diﬀerentiated goods. When
trade moves the economy from a steady state with low trade to one with higher trade, the
elasticity of demand facing the ﬁrms increases, but the elasticity of the desired mark-up
declines. The balance of these two forces is the key element determining how the degree of
strategic complementarity, and with it the inﬂation-marginal costs component of the Phillips
curve slope, vary.
I argue that it is not clear that the trade increase observed in the globalization period is
strong enough to have generated a decline in this component of the slope. When marginal cost
is related to output, there is a further eﬀect of the trade increase on the overall slope, since
in the model the elasticity of marginal cost to aggregate output comprises the elasticity sy
which is indeed a decreasing function of traded goods. This eﬀect is, however, quantitatively
small, as the ﬁgures show.
A proper analysis of all the eﬀects of a more integrated economy on the inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ would require to move more clearly to an open-economy setup, which would allow
one to account for the price dynamics of goods produced abroad and consumed, as ﬁnal
or intermediate goods, in the domestic economy. As it has been shown (see for example
Razin and Yuen 2002) the open economy Phillips curve is ﬂatter than the curve of a closed
economy, even in the presence of a constant elasticity of marginal cost to output, because the
overall slope is declining in a trade openness parameter. My analysis could be interpreted
as an analysis of the eﬀects of increase in competition, for a given degree of openness of the
economy, when an increase in the actual trade takes place.
That said, it doesn’t necessarily mean that globalization had no eﬀect on inﬂation dy-
namics. Throughout my analysis I maintain the nominal rigidity component of the slope
unchanged. This is not because the frequency of price changes is unaﬀected by a more global
environment. It is simply because it is reasonable to assume that it is not the amount of
trade per se that should induce a more frequent adjustment of prices. Price stickiness is
instead typically motivated by re-optimization costs, which are essentially driven by the cost
of gathering information.
Moreover, the claims that globalization aﬀect the frequency of price adjustment go both
32ways. On one hand, Rogoﬀ (2003) argues that globalization has led to greater price ﬂexibility
- in the model this translates in a lower α, hence in a steepening of the curve. On the other
hand, if globalization has brought an overall lower level of inﬂation, as argued by many, than
there is less incentive to revise prices often, because the cost of price misalignment is lower.
Endogeneizing the frequency of price adjustment is indeed an active area of research.
8 Appendix
This appendix explains how I compute the elasticity of marginal cost deﬁned in expression
(29) as a function of the traded goods N. This involves computing how aggregate output
Y varies with N, and calibrating the parameter Φ. From expression (28), one derives the







where w denotes the steady state real wage. Assuming a fairly standard preference spec-
iﬁcation: u(C,h)=l o g C − 1
1+νh1+ν, the real wage is wt = Hν











where I used the deﬁnition of hours in (27). Steady state aggregate hours are then
H = N (xY + Φ)
1
1−a ,





ν (xY + Φ)
ν+a
1−a Y. (40)
From (31) in the text the steady state real marginal cost is s =1 /Nµx. Combining this
expression with (40) we obtain that







This expression deﬁnes a concave, increasing function Y = Y (N). For a given calibration
of the parameters a,ν and Φ,a n yv a l u eo fN determines a value of Y , which, together with
the value of x, allows to compute a value for the elasticity sy. I set the parameter ν to be
equal to 2, which corresponds to assuming a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of .5, the high
33end of the range typically found in micro studies; 1−a = .68, to roughly match the average
observed labor share for the U.S. To calibrate Φ I ﬁrst use the entry condition to establish










Then I set Φ suﬃciently close but strictly lower than Φu to allow entry of new ﬁrms with
positive proﬁts: Φ = .2. The results are not very sensitive to the range of values chosen
for these parameters, since they have mostly a scale eﬀect on sy, and hence on ζ, without
aﬀecting its curvature.
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